Evaluation of Engagement and Capacity Support

BOC's Contribution to IROs

According to recipient IROs, BOC is an important and appreciated source of funds supporting some of their core operating costs. However, the extent to which interviewees indicated that BOC positions their organizations to effectively and meaningfully advocate on behalf of their membership was highly variable. BOC funding provides organizations with some core organizational support to be able to advocate on behalf of their members with various levels of government. Virtually every IRO that spoke with evaluators voiced their need and gratitude for the dependability of BOC funding. However, IROs also noted – with equal unanimity – that basic costs such as rent, utilities, one or two executive salaries, and an annual gathering of membership were not the full extent of their actual core capacity costs. Recipient IRO participants in this evaluation said that a fair list of the core expenses required to perform their day-to-day business would include:

• a functioning workspace;
• a full contingent of staff (recruited and retained through stable and competitive compensation and benefits packages);
• a travel budget reflective of geographic location and regular involvement in engagement on federal (not just CIRNAC) policy and programs; and
• a small set aside of contingency funds for unanticipated emergencies.

The vast majority of IROs participating in this evaluation indicated that the level of BOC funding over the period of evaluation was significantly less than required to staff and operate their robust organizations. Therefore, in and of itself, BOC does not position organizations to contribute to and participate in policy and program development. Rather, BOC funding provides support for  covering some basic operating costs and the Government may then make available additional dollars based on its identified priorities.

Prior to drastic budget cuts as a result of the Deficit Reduction Action Plan in 2012, organizations were funded according to a funding formula that considered factors such as region and population represented by the organization. Since 2012, funding levels have not been restored to those prior to 2012; this has resulted in IROs having to seek alternative sources of funding for their needs.

Organizational existence and financial stability, while necessary for an IRO to function on the most basic level, do not necessarily enable the level of capacity required to provide meaningful contributions and input into federal endeavours – and to support the departmental goals of advancing Indigenous self-determination and a renewed relationship with Indigenous peoples. Meaningful engagement involves stakeholders having an opportunity to influence outcomes before they are decided, and provides an opportunity to influence future decisions/policy.^{Footnote 6} Under the current approach, IROs are working tirelessly to contribute and participate in government policy and program development, when provided with additional support to do so. If core capacity funding to IROs was more reflective of real core capacity costs, these contributions would likely increase in both scale and depth.

At the intermediate and ultimate outcome levels, there are no performance indicators in place to track changes in the degree to which representative Indigenous organizations, their members, and elected officials are increasingly informed as a result of BOC, or BOC's contribution to Indigenous peoples. As described above, the evaluation team found little evidence that BOC funding on its own has contributed to these outcomes beyond supporting minimal basic operating costs.

Clarity For Funding Levels

No funding formula currently exists for the BOC authority to guide the equitable basis of funding between IROs. The most recent policy document, written in 2010, is no longer in effect as a result of government-wide budget cuts in 2012. These cuts impacted BOC's funding levels significantly, as amounts provided to each recipient IRO post-2012 were based on pre‑determined levels. The pre-2012 funding formula took into account the number of regional offices, the number of IROs in each region, and the populations of each IRO's membership (based on on-reserve First Nations census data), and divided the total amount available based on these considerations. The cuts in 2012 removed the use of a funding formula and allocations have not returned to pre-2012 levels for the majority of recipients.

Many recipients stated that it is unclear to them how their BOC funding levels are calculated; many do not understand why they receive the amounts that they do, and there was sentiment expressed that the principal recipients of funding are NIOs, which risks constraining access to funds for smaller and/or regional IROs.

Text alternative for Figure 1: Distribution of funding between NIOs and Regional IROs

Figure 1 is a stacked bar chart showing funding percentage distributions over a six year period spanning from 2013 to 2019. Funding recipients included 44 IROs and 6 NIOs.

In 2013-2014, Regional IROs received 66% and NIOs received 34% of the total funding.

In 2014-2015, Regional IROs received 60% and NIOs received 40% of the total funding.

In 2015-2016, Regional IROs received 60% and NIOs received 40% of the total funding.

In 2016-2017, Regional IROs received 60% and NIOs received 40% of the total funding.

In 2017-2018, Regional IROs received 62% and NIOs received 38% of the total funding.

In 2018-2019, Regional IROs received 63% and NIOs received 37% of the total funding.

Recipients in northern and rural areas have indicated that the funding they receive does not seem to take into consideration the costs associated with doing business in these areas. For example, the travel costs for an organization in the North to participate in engagements held in the South, are higher based on the price of flights and the amount of time required to travel. Other organizations have expressed that they do not feel that BOC funding provides adequate support to reflect the number of members the organizations serves.

This evaluation found a difference in approach to relationship-building and the level of core capacity funding between national and regional IROs. Between 2014/15 and 2018/19, each year, between 35 percent and 39 percent of the total BOC envelope intended for 50 recipients was allocated to five NIOs. For at least two (the Assembly of First Nations and the MNC, as well as Inuit Tapariit Kanatami to a lesser extent) of the five NIOs, BOC funding was said to not only better support core capacity needs, but was also achieved through negotiation between the NIOs and the Department. These negotiated agreements at the national level often also take into consideration program and project-specific funding agreements under the umbrella of a broader comprehensive funding agreement, seemingly in recognition of the benefits for both parties in having the total amount of funded activities (and funds to carry out these activities) be stable and predictable. The three IROs representing Indigenous women do not have funding agreements of this nature; however, new partnership agreements were signed with the Native Women's Association of Canada (2019) and Pauktuutit Inuit Women of Canada (2017) during the evaluation period. Neither of these agreements included guaranteed capacity or project funding.

The Reality of IROs: Who they are and What they do

BOC recipient IROs across Canada often listed offerings of wide-ranging programs (from job training initiatives to elder support to childrearing training classes for recent or expecting mothers, among many others), housing developments (most often subsidized rental units), and other business ventures (from natural resource harvesting to leasing of commercial spaces) as activities performed by their organizations in addition to political advocacy. As non-profit corporations, each revenue-generating activity is used to provide such programs and the staff required to do so on a temporary basis as additional funding streams that are project‑based are by nature less stable, predictable, and sufficient to meet existing need. IROs also frequently represent their member nations in self-government negotiations and treaty claims/litigation with the federal government.

As currently designed, BOC is not intended to support IROs in delivering on the full extent of their mandates – it is a support for input on CIRNAC policy and programs. The actual operating capacity of IROs to fulfill the mandates for which they were established by their members is primarily funded through additional authorities and programs (most often from CIRNAC, as well as other government departments) on a proposal and project‑specific basis. However, these additional aspects of their mandate beyond advocacy were routinely identified by recipient IRO participants in this evaluation as providing organizations with a more holistic understanding of the needs of their members, which was seen as essential to  provide meaningful and effective advocacy.

BOC funding is therefore focused on the subsistence of IROs, as opposed to funding the full extent of their mandates. Without the ability to fulfill its mandate, an organization may not be able to fully contribute to government policy and program development.

When examining the full suite of funding used by IROs and the relative contribution of the predictable funding (BOC), there is a disconnect between the objective of BOC as supporting an organization's basic capacity and its primary outcome  – Indigenous contributions to policy development – particularly when a wider view of the role of IROs is taken into consideration as a valuable element of desired inputs. According to many interviewees, BOC's intended outcomes would be much more effectively supported if BOC was considered more of a support for actual 'core' (i.e. costs IROs consider to be necessary to fulfill their mandates) as opposed to 'basic' (i.e. the costs associated with simply existing as an IRO) operational capacity, and with an acknowledgement of the full mandates of recipient IROs.

Engagement is Increasing in Quantity, but not Necessarily in Quality

Many recipients of C&PD funding noted an increase in departmental requests for engagement on a wide spectrum of federal policy and program reform over the period of evaluation. The evaluation team considers that this increase is largely attributed to the Government's commitment to a renewed nation-to-nation, government-to-government, and Inuit-Crown relationship with Indigenous peoples — one based on recognition of rights, respect, and partnership. Seen by most Indigenous organizations interviewed as a positive development, the increase in engagement activities was not seen to include the provision of sufficient resources (time as well as money) to contribute and participate meaningfully in engagements.

For those IROs engaged on a policy or program during the evaluation period, the evaluation found a general sentiment that organizations are more involved in reform discussions, but it's not clear the extent to which they're being heard due to:

• limited time allotted for discussion and consideration of the policy or program area by IROs and their members;
• a sense that decisions were already made within government;
• perception that there is a heavy reliance on NIOs, particularly the Assembly of First Nations, and not necessarily on IROs and First Nations; and
• a lack of mechanism by which to determine how their perspectives were incorporated into policy.

If not approached in a way that provides both adequate time and resources, engagement efforts can be detrimental to relationships with external partners. Increased engagement intersects with increasing research fatigue on the part of the under-resourced. This approach to engagement leads to further stretching these organizations' time, human and financial resources.

At the intermediate outcome level, there are no performance indicators in place to track changes in the degree and/or way in which engagement with stakeholders influences the development of policies and programs. The evaluation team sought to understand contributions to this outcome through interviews with IROs and departmental staff. IROs expressed that they had no clear sense of the way in which their feedback had been taken into consideration in policies and programs. The Department's unit responsible for managing C&PD were not aware of existing and uniform feedback mechanisms in place across the Department or its various sectors.

Finally, the evaluation team considers that the ultimate outcome for this authority does not follow logically from the earlier outcome statements, in that the authority is intended to influence policy and programs (intermediate outcome) – presumably with a view to improving their quality and sensitivity to the needs of Indigenous stakeholders – which does not then follow to a consideration of Indigenous inputs at the ultimate outcome level.

C&PD's Connection to BOC, FICP & IROs

The additional $10 million of dedicated C&PD funds for IROs that is managed by Funding Arrangement Management Experts is mainly (70 percent) funded by CIRNAC to IROs via the regional offices of ISC for distribution to IROs. A smaller percentage is distributed to NIOs directly by Funding Arrangement Management Experts, with an even smaller percentage kept in reserve for unforeseen contingencies. While C&PD funds are meant to support the collection of Indigenous input on policy and program development, the evaluation finds that this dedicated $10 million is in practice additional capacity support for recognized IROs and therefore supplementing BOC funding.

Many recipient IROs and departmental officials that participated in this evaluation referred to C&PD expenditures as ‘topping up' insufficient BOC funding, particularly in a post-Deficit Reduction Action Plan context. The interconnectedness of the BOC and C&PD authorities is further demonstrated when their outputs are viewed together as being necessary to achieve their shared intended outcomes – or in other words, BOC and C&PD combined, provide recipients with the core operational capacity to contribute and participate in government policy and program development, when provided with sufficient engagement funding.

Previous evaluations of C&PD and BOC noted that there was an overlap and lack of clarity between the BOC and C&PD authorities. The C&PD authority is intended to be a vehicle for a wide range of engagements between CIRNAC and Indigenous peoples for the development and implementation of departmental policy and programming. According to the C&PD Terms and Conditions, eligible activities are "those that investigate, develop, propose, review inform or consult on policy matters within the mandate of Department of Indian and Northern Development (DIAND)". The specific types of eligible activities are workshops, studies, meetings, and policy development, all for subject matter related to CIRNAC policy and programming. Through the interview process and reviews of literature and documentation, the current evaluation, as well as the two previous evaluations found that such flexibility is desirable given that C&PD funding is used across the range of CIRNAC activities and Indigenous organizations in Canada. If engagement processes and objectives are to reflect collaboration and partnership, then the Department should be positioned to respond to emerging issues and priorities that impact its mandate.

This flexibility, an obvious strength of the C&PD authority, can also be seen as a weakness.  While it is clear that flexibility is required, the C&PD authority can be interpreted very loosely because of a lack of clarity around what can be funded or, perhaps more importantly, what cannot be funded. Such loose interpretations means that the C&PD authority often gets used to flow monies that may be justified, but fit better under the BOC authority because the funded activities are not always directly related to engagement initiatives. When monies are allocated in this way, the expected results that derive from consultations and the associated reporting will not occur.

It should be noted that C&PD funding is intended to support specific engagement initiatives linked with defined deliverables and outcomes that are related to policy and program development and implementation. As noted above, supporting an ongoing function using the C&PD authority suggests a mismatch and that the C&PD funding is sometimes used as "top-up" money to complement existing BOC resources. Such cases could indicate issues around the level and use of funding as well as a lack of clarity concerning which authority should be used.

The intended purpose of the C&PD authority can be understood in the context of two important types of funding provided to CIRNAC recipients: core funding; and, project funding. Core funding is designed to support the basic existence of a recipient organization and includes categories such as staff salaries and costs for basic maintenance and utilities. Project funding extends beyond these categories to include specific initiatives that, conceptually, have beginnings and ends. Projects (i.e., engagement activities) may be multi-year, but they are not ongoing because they have a foreseeable end with clearly defined expected results. It is apparent in program documentation, that the intent of the C&PD is for clearly defined engagement initiatives. However, as noted in this evaluation, C&PD is often used to ‘top-up' core operations.

The confusion between core funding and project funding can be seen in the idea of "core-like" activities. Core-like activities are those that do not seem to fit neatly under either the core or project categories: they usually seem closely related to the raison d'être of the organization, and extend beyond basics such as buildings, utilities and salaries. A comparison of the BOC authority and the C&PD authority reveals a potential source of confusion. The BOC authority, is intended to be for core operations, while the C&PD authority is to be dedicated to project funding for consultations on policy and program development and implementation, however, their stated objectives are very similar. In addition, the FICP authority also shares similar objectives to BOC and C&PD. Table 4  shows a comparison of the main expected results of the three authorities.

From this comparison it can be seen that the three authorities have similar objectives. BOC and C&PD authorities both pertain to participating in program and policy development. The FICP authority also has commonalities with BOC and C&PD. FICP's Governance Stream shares similar objectives with BOC, while FICP's Project Stream is similar to C&PD. There are also commonalities between the authorities in terms of recipients.  BOC and C&PD provide funding to IROs and Indigenous peoples, and the FICP and BOC support Métis and Non-Status Indian Representative Organizations.  

The two previous evaluations made recommendations that were intended to resolve the overlap issues between the BOC and C&PD authorities. The 2009 Evaluation of Consultation and Policy Development and Basic Organizational Capacity Funding recommended that the BOC and C&PD authorities should be combined because of their similarity. The 2014 Evaluation of Engagement and Policy Development, which only covered the C&PD authority, but made reference to the BOC authority because it's similarity with C&PD, recommended that their differences be clarified to ensure that C&PD funding is allocated for engagement activities to inform policy and program development, rather than for core and core-like activities.

The current evaluation is broader than the two previous evaluations because it also includes  the FICP authority, however, it makes similar observations around the overlap of the authorities. Because there are now three authorities that have similar objectives and recipients, this evaluation finds that work should be undertaken to improve coordination and alignment between the authorities.

There are a variety of ways to improve coordination and alignment between  authorities, such as putting in place multiple funding streams (e.g., core funding, project funding, and capacity building funding) to Regional Operations from the authorities. Regardless of the specific approach that is taken, the authorities should enable the strategic coordination of funding and should reduce the overlap to improve efficiencies in program delivery and reporting on the funding.

FICP Governance - A Strong Support for Métis Governments

In the Governance Stream of FICP funding, the evaluation found a robust, intentional, and effective vehicle for Canada's support to the MNC Governing Members on their respective paths to self-government. In particular, the evaluation found an intentional approach on the part of the FICP Governance Stream to anticipate and systematically support MNC Governing Members in addressing each element of the traditional negotiation process toward self-government, as typically conducted by the Treaties and Aboriginal Government Sector of CIRNAC. This approach demonstrated the clear benefits and increased efficiencies for all parties in providing such intentional support to Indigenous partners in achieving the goals and end-destinations determined by Indigenous peoples themselves, and thus is directly aligned with departmental objectives.

For example, as it relates to the immediate outcome of establishing and maintaining registries, MNC Governing Members interviewed through this evaluation spoke to continued progress in the development and maintenance of their registries as a result of dedicated FICP funding. While funding for Métis registries has been ongoing since the Supreme Court of Canada's Powley decision in 2004, there has been an increase in requests for Métis citizenship subsequent to the Supreme Court of Canada's Daniels Decision in 2016. There has also been  an increased recognition of Métis governments by the Crown and associated funding for Métis governments to offer services to their citizens in the period of the evaluation. Aside from managing this increased demand on the registration process, the following additional activities have been undertaken by some MNC Governing Members to develop and strengthen registries: improvement of the security of files and recordkeeping; transfer of a registry from a paper based registry to an automated database; initiation of a joint process between MNC Governing Members, the Reconciliation Secretariat and the Canada Standards Association to establish a standard on operations of Powley-compliant Métis registries jointly between MNC Governing Members, the Reconciliation Secretariat and the Canada Standards Association.

Funding recipients also noted the foundational nature of this aspect of FICP funding to all other operations of their governments on behalf of their citizens.

As it relates to the intermediate outcome of increasing organizational and governance capacity, MNC Governing Members worked on various areas according to their priorities as per the design of the FICP Governance Funding Stream. For example, one MNC Governing Member mentioned their focus on registering citizens and building a governance structure, or "the infrastructure of what the government will be and how we deliver programs and services", including a strategic plan, as well as moving forward on self-government negotiations.

As it relates to the ultimate outcome of strengthening the Crown-Métis relationships, Métis Government Recognition and Self-Government Agreements were signed in June 2019 with the Métis Nation of Alberta, the Métis Nation of Ontario, and the Métis Nation-Saskatchewan.  Respondents in the evaluation consider that support provided by the FICP authority to members of the Métis Nation, with the intention of achieving self-government, contributed to this historic achievement; in particular, by allowing for the establishment of objectively verifiable membership registries by MNC Governing Members. This follows on the equally historic announcement in 2017 that, as part of the National Housing Strategy, $500 million will be provided over 10 years to support a Métis Nation housing strategy. The evaluation found that Métis governments consider these significant achievements as indicators of the advancement of Canada's relationship with the Métis Nation and ongoing efforts at reconciliation.

FICP Governance funding is negotiated, multi-year, substantial, and flexible, and therefore allows the MNC and Governing Members to determine their own priorities and manage funds as they best see fit (including the means to reallocate and rollover funding), with minimal reporting requirements. Thus, the Governance Stream's design and implementation demonstrated a positive example of how a government-to-government relationship operates in practice based on recognition of rights, respect, co-operation and partnership and how the design of the funding model contributes to the achievement of outcomes.

FICP Projects

As mentioned above, there is no clear theory of change for the FICP Projects Stream. The intended outcomes for the FICP authority refer only to Métis Nation organizations, not non-MNC-affiliated organizations or Non-Status Indian groups, both of which are eligible for FICP funding. In addition, the projects funded under this authority are not strongly connected to an intended outcome, and ultimately program staff indicated a lack of clarity as to what projects ought to be funded and why. As such, the evaluation found that the FICP Projects Stream is in need of further consideration and strategic planning to be more intentional in its approach, and therefore increase its effectiveness.

The Supreme Court of Canada's 2016 decision in Daniels v Canada in recognition of the "Indian" status of Métis and Non-Status Indians, as defined in Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, and resulting federal fiduciary responsibility towards Métis and Non-Status Indians, sparked a significant increase in demand for FICP project funding. However, no strategy or policy direction has yet been developed by CIRNAC in response to this landmark ruling. As a result, interested potential applicants are told to apply, however, the existing $3.7 million is already oversubscribed. The evaluation found that there is not a clear strategy and policy approach for the authority.

Gender Equity

The recently established Reconciliation Secretariat within CIRNAC's Policy and Strategic Direction Sector has undergone considerable restructuring over the period of evaluation, and now includes (but is not limited to) three separate directorates for Crown-First Nations, Crown-Métis, and Crown-Inuit relations. With responsibility for the Permanent Bilateral Mechanisms, of which the Assembly of First Nations, MNC and Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami are participants, the inclusion of responsibility for relationships with these national Indigenous partner organizations makes sense within the Secretariat. The responsibility for relationships with Métis and Non-Status Indians and women's IROs are not a part of the Secretariat. These two distinctions-based categories are managed by the Indigenous Relations and Policy Directorate under the Director General of Aboriginal and External Relations, the branch which manages the three authorities examined through this evaluation.

Accords were signed in 2018-2019 with the Native Women's Association of Canada  and the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples. The accord with the Native's Women's Association of Canada came with related (albeit not guaranteed as part of the accord) funding, while the accord with Congress of Aboriginal People did not include funding or a strategy to address the bourgeoning community of Section 91(24) claimants/applicants.